By
Dr Graham Little PhD AFNZIM
January 2004
Content
Abstract
Understanding of a person remains confused and debated; in psychology the
manner and type of cognitions are seen and understood to influence the person,
whereas in psychiatry, all that is human is taken as a medical condition.
Frequently these two quite distinct ways of seeing and understanding people
seem to operate and act and react within quite different worlds, one often
ignoring or demeaning the other professionally, ethically and legally.
This paper outlines a model of causality
of human mood and conduct that offers complete reconciliation of these two
views of people.
The paper discusses how the model leads to the phenomenological insight
that the tension between physical causation and free will is a core and
fundamental facet of the human experience; necessarily and unavoidably experienced
by all people. Our humanity is forged in this effort of mind to overcome
matter, all freedom rooted in the struggle to free the will in the mind
of the individual to surmount the drives and causal forces within the body
and brain of that same person.
The paper clearly defines this conflict of free will and cause, showing
how it arises within the model and is a necessary and fundamental aspect
of all human experience.
The causal model of human
mood and conduct 1
The theory is summed in the diagram below. The diagram is precisely a diagram
of immediate effects as derived from the system PersonçèEnvironment.
The terms are defined as follows
Key points relating to the theory are as follows.
Relationship
between roles and mental sets
The idea of mental set, of systems of emotion and thought linked with a situation
or an object of thought, or some part of that system, is the basic structure
of personality. Variations in both structure and content of mental sets between
individuals explain differences in the personality of those individuals. However,
mental sets are not always readily identifiable by the person, most often they
can be, but could take considerable time and guidance requiring reflection and
exploring of history before the structures emerge.
It is useful to use a grouping of mental
sets, typically related to some situation or type of situation, this grouping
I call a role and matches the typical use of the term in the literature. A role
is defined as a set of behaviours and feelings related to some situation. So
roles would include father, mother, friend, lover, manager, coach etc.
If personality describes the overall structure and content of the mental sets
of a person that is personality is a term grouping all mental sets, then a role
describes the sub-groupings relative to a type of situation.
Roles are useful tools for assisting people to explore and best make sense of
what they do. For example, Eric Berne’s transactional analysis is based on roles
of parent, adult and child. In this system the concept is taken further, and
based on a more structured and fundamental theory of psychology.
Roles may be explored and used in two ways. First, by looking at how a person
typically acts in a situation, this explores their role structure in that situation.
It may then be useful to explore deeper and uncover why they feel that way,
and what in their history has resulted in the mental sets that underlie the
role. In this way roles can be explored in a personal development manner, highlighting
thoughts, attitudes and emotions that are helpful and those not so helpful,
enabling change of the role or removing role confusion, or they are used as
the start point for much deeper exploring of the person’s history and hence
their psyche.
The second way of using roles is as training tool. Situations are identified,
desirable outcomes agreed then the competencies and skills, attitudes and thoughts
that best enable the outcomes are identified and offered to the person. Emotions
need to be discussed, and the person needs to understand the emotional tone
important for the effective enacting of the role. But quite likely the emotions
will not initially be felt by the person, but emerge as the person builds fluency
with the role and those aspects of thought and action that constitute delivery
of the role. Building and consolidating roles is not only an important therapeutic
tool, but also an important aspect of personal growth, and an important aspect
of development in business and other professions.
Emergence
and importance of meaning
Elsewhere I have discussed how ideas arise4
, and how they emerge from an often-broad activity, not localized, necessarily,
although the verbal description may be localized, but this is not the fullness
of the idea, merely its verbal summary or notation or description.
The important issue is that the meaning of the idea cannot as a matter of principle
be assessed or in any way determined from the outside, meaning emerges only
from within, only the person knows the meaning, and in particular only the person
knows the meaning for them, for only they are able to relate and otherwise interpret
the idea in relation to their world view. It is the meaning for them the person
will act upon.
In more precise terms, meaning will typically involve the combination of several
mental sets, these being the sets most related to and most engaged with the
circumstances within which the individual is located. This does mean that a
person with significant diversity in their world view may act differently in
this situation than might be expected from their conduct in other, not immediately
related circumstances that will involve other, not immediately related mental
sets. Such circumstances will depend on the extent the person has an integrated
world view, the extent their personality is a ‘blended whole’ with most aspects
of their world view and emotional structures congruent one with the other. Where
this is not the case, and where mental sets are allowed to operate independently,
then the person may produce significant surprises.
There will also be meaning within meaning, within… The person may or may not
understand or be able to describe all the nuances, or underlying issues that
might be integrated into their ‘meaning’. This arises if or when the cognitive
aspect of some mental set has been lost, so only the feeling and the nuances
remain, but these can be very powerful feelings that provide the overall flavor
to the meaning.
The fundamental human phenomenological
condition: the struggle to be free
One of the major issues in any proposed general theory of psychology is the
question of cause: is physical causation a factor in human affairs, how, and
in what manner does it relate to or interact with free will?
Within the model as proposed, physical causation is the functioning of the body
in the form of the brain and central nervous system. The first and most simple
example is habit, which is explained as the brain and CNS operating without
active intervention of the mechanisms of attention, and the system functioning
as a fully physical system. Simple examples in life might be walking on a beach
while conversing with a friend, the mechanisms of walking left to habit, but
should matters change, such as the ground become rocky or uneven, attention
can be used to exercise control to ensure one does not trip; another example,
when driving a well traveled route, and failing to take the turn off wanted
due lack of attention with habit directing the vehicle to the regular destination.
These are all every day events where physical causation shaped conduct, or some
aspect of conduct.
The attention system in the model has two primary characteristics, first it
is able to be spread or focused, so attention can be interacting with many of
the operative systems or with only a few. Second, the manner of the interaction
of attention with some mental set can vary from passive to full active intervention,
so when walking on the beach, we can observe our action of walking, or we can
intervene and deliberately place our feet where we choose. In circumstances
where the attention system is not able to interact with a neural system, such
as might be with the autonomous nervous system, then we are not able to exercise
control, or otherwise influence the system and it is fully dominated by physical
causation.
The first point is that all mental sets are driven by physical causation, so
that in circumstances where a set is triggered, say by being in the appropriate
circumstances, then the emergence of our historical understanding and feeling
of such circumstances will occur, this is the borrowed knowledge of Ashby, arising
from memory, with the addition of the feelings and emotions encoded in combination
with that knowledge and memory of the circumstances. In short, in the first
instance, our reactions are due physical causation.
The second point is that where attention interacts with a mental set, and the
model has it that all aspects of our psychology are so able to interact, then
the attention system is able to mediate, modify, and even stop the physical
causation so that the affects of the mental set, while felt and or sensed within,
may not be evident from without. This is the exercise of free will: But seldom
is it exercised without a price in effort and energy.
Thinking
as an active event
Where physical causation is dominant there can and will be thoughts in association
with some events and feelings, this is the activation of the mental sets of
the model. However, these thoughts arise solely from memory, there are fully
and entirely ‘borrowed knowledge’, in that they are the thoughts (and the feelings)
we acquired from our previous experience and reflection upon such events.
In that these thoughts and feelings are historical, they represent historical
intent that is the historical manner we thought and felt of the events;
where this is still valid, and in particular where this is valid and the events
sufficiently the same, then this historical intent may be valid. However, where
events are changed, or where our views have developed, for example, where education
has altered our world view, then historical intent may not be valid, and it
is only by active intervention of attention that we can assess and re-assess,
and so exercise our current intent, that is to control the
physical causation, and to act in a manner we decide according to our choices
and free will.
This analysis is general, and in the absence of active attention moderating
a mental set, and re-assessing our options, then the mental set will be driven
by physical causation, and even though we will have thoughts and this can offer
the appearance of free will, in fact it is not, and we are acting out what are
in effect complex and sophisticated habits involving emotions and cognitions.
For much of life, in understood and slow changing circumstances, this is a benefit,
since energy is conserved, and life and existence has a comfortable flow. Such
circumstances are commonly called ‘being in one’s comfort zone’.
The danger of such comfort zones, as well as there advantages is well illustrated
in the example of driving a regular and well known route, coming to the intersection,
and thinking ‘have I been over the old bridge’. This means that the act of driving
was fully physical causation, and provided the circumstances were exactly as
they were last time the route was driven, it is not a problem; however, if on
the blind bend there was a major slip, or the bridge was washed out, or another
vehicle was traveling too fast on the wrong side of the road, then reaction
to the changed events would be increased by the time it took us to ‘attend’.
This is precisely lack of attention, as well understood, and having precisely
the effects as commonly expected. This is an obvious example; equally we can
have lack of attention to our partner, work, schooling, etc,
occurring over longer periods of time and with similar effects.
Effort of will
The imagery is one of cause in conflict with free will, this is not always the
case, and as outlined above, for much life, cause and free will are congruent
in our comfort zones where we do not have to exercise the effort.
The conflict of free will and cause comes most sharply in circumstances that
are difficult or stressful; for example, in the case of a marriage breakdown
and divorce, with children and custody and assets all being debated in addition
to resolving the blame and fear and uncertainty of the future.
The forces of physical causation within us, in events as demanding as divorce,
may easily press us to emotive and angry reactions not appropriate or not really
what we mean or intend toward the other person: we may say things we do not
really mean, we may do things we immediately regret, we may experience emotions
beyond that we have felt or normally feel. Containing these more extremes of
our mental sets, or our own causation may demand a most intense act of will.
The only technique is to hold reaction in check, and to ensure we move with
a slow deliberateness fully attending all we do and say. To act with such control
is extremely difficult, requiring considerable skill and more importantly a
deeper desire to do so. By this ‘deeper desire’, is meant that if the images
of self that surround and support the overall structure of self within the system
that is diagram 6 do not reflect this desire to self-control and composure,
then it is very much less likely that the necessary self control will be effectively
exercised. This ‘deeper desire’ is not ‘deeper’ in terms of the model, merely
that it is much less likely to ever be discussed, it may or may not be readily
apparent to the person themselves, who may not be immediately conscious of there
own self-image’, the system merely makes it clear there will be one, and it
will be influential, as are all the multi-faceted aspects of the self within
a person.
Collusion of our psychic self with causation
There exists an overall ‘self’; this includes everything that is ‘us’, mind/spirit,
the actual structure of self, and body. Within this model, there are several
components, for example, aspects of self, relating to self-image, other aspects
relating to our spirit, and others describing our body and operation of our
neural systems. The model also makes clear there is no reason to assume these
components are always operating in harmony, so we can be in conflict with ourselves,
the simplest example is where physical causation operates through our mental
sets pressing some particular reaction that we know will be counter productive,
yet we may struggle to contain.
Overall I propose that the psychic self (self, and mind and spirit, all aspects
of our psychic self, yet all embraced and able to be analyzed by way of the
model diagram 6) can be discussed and understood as separate from the physical
self, and that our physical self (psychological embodied in our mental sets
that bring historical intent to the circumstances via our borrowed knowledge)
can and is often in conflict with our psychic self. The exercise of free will
is when our psychic self dominates our existence and our conduct as regards
events, and physical cause or our physical self (causation) dominates our existence
when we do not exercise free will as regards our conduct toward events.
At all times, our attention systems are able to intervene,
and as a result able to moderate and able to facilitate the exercise of free
will and choice. Where the free will is not exercised, then I describe the circumstance
as one of collusion between our psychic self and physical self.
We choose not to intervene, whether that choice deliberate
or passive, we allow causation to operate, and often we know we have done so.
This position brings significant issues of motivation to the fore; for example,
in one mental set, I may want something, wish for it, but not willing to actually
do it. Then one day, events transpire whereby it will occur all one need do
is be passive. Say for example, it is a terrible event, such as the death of
a spouse, and he or she is caught swimming in a rip, the person looks on and
later pleads helplessness, and the event wanted, the death, occurred. The wish
for the death may never have been said, may never have even been fully admitted
by the person to themselves, but it was there. The deeper desire needs no more
elaborate explanation than available in diagram 6. Many aspects of many mental
sets will be only known to the person. Many other aspects of mental sets will
moderate the more extreme feelings and wishes, some of the wishes may not be
fully expressed as ideas, merely vague and broad sense of things preferred,
mental sets without full cognitive structures, perhaps drawing vague cognitive
definition from other associated mental sets.
The type of example outlined above can
be made as subtle or as complex as can be imagined, the analysis requires no
more than application of diagram 6 in order to facilitate insight and understanding,
our collusion may not be a deliberate or directly conscious act, merely a vague
resistance to taking any action, and where there may be restrictions to our
action, then we may even feel vindicated in our lack of action: Well able to
rationalize. Where we remain in touch with broader and less public aspects of
our psychic self, then most likely we will know and have some if not guilt then
disquiet knowledge of our collusion. The depth (in terms of not available to
public review, or even not fully conceptualized by the person themselves) of
this structure leaves forever the potential for anyone to surprise and to exhibit
conduct quite unexpected from all previous conduct.
In any and all circumstances where causation dominates free will, then we are
either inattentive, or we allowed it to occur (we colluded with cause), or we
were unable to stop it.
Cause beyond our control
There are two circumstances where free will is not able to dominate cause: first,
when events are beyond that any person could be reasonably expected to contain.
For example, under torture or threat to life, it is not expected a person exercise
full psychic control; or when a father sees their daughter being raped, immediate
reactions overpowering psychic control would be expected. Generally, in daily
life, any lapses in exercise of free will become the responsibility of the person
with little other consequence. The issue comes more to the fore when the resulting
conduct was illegal, then any mitigation becomes very important, as does the
judgment of ‘circumstances beyond those a normal person would be expected to
tolerate’, this judgment is social, cultural and moral, and as such moves beyond
the bounds of a general theory of psychology and what it can and cannot tell
us, for the judgment requires selection of values of variables, and as such
goes beyond the nature and operation of the variables themselves.
The second circumstance is where the attention mechanism is unable to cope,
in particular being defective. It needs be clear that the attention mechanism
cannot, as a matter of principle, be defective for any reason of psychology:
The model allows no such disorder. The only manner of defect of the attention
system is where the mechanism of attention is defective that is the attention
system is defective due neurological disorder. As discussed and defined, all
such neurological disorder is described as mental illness. Therefore, where
a person is mentally ill, then they cannot exercise nor can they be expected
to exercise free will in the manner and to the extent expected of someone who
is not mentally ill. This paper is on psychology, and psychological dysfunction,
and will not discuss or explore issues defined as mental illness, which are
not psychological but neurological.
Cause and our
energy
The model and implications raise various questions:
As stated in the discussion of the model,
only attention is able to intervene such as to thwart or otherwise modify the
neural operation according to the inherent mechanisms of the neural system.
The inherent mechanisms are that defined and described by the brain structures.
We can understand the manner of attention intervening in a mental set as exactly
equivalent to being able to move one’s left arm, we know internal states, and
by activating one of those states then we achieve certain bodily outcomes. Attending
to and moderating one’s internal psychological states is exactly the same, but
not a process deliberately taught, nor emphasized as significant 5.
The model of neural functioning has been previously outlined6
, and requires no more than already well understood and accepted. To follow
the argument, a mental set determined by causality with neurons following the
path of lowest energy barrier, this being in large part determined by previous
use and repetition. This is effectively the definition of habit.
The path of lowest energy barrier will be influenced by other factors, for instance:
The balance of neural flow will be along
the path of least resistance, with entropy determining that the energy will
dissipate to fill all available states of lowest energy. There will be a minimum
difference between energy barriers that will act as a complete deterrent, below
this difference, the energy may well spread itself through several mental sets,
but only those in some way interrelated to and interactive with those currently
operative. To that extent, a mental set can also be seen as bounds within which
neural energy is contained, this energy also able to be called our ‘psychic
energy’, particularly as regards those mental sets that do underpin our personality
and spirit.
Two fundamental types of psychological
neural mechanism
The model contains two quite different types of psychological component, Thought
and Emotion. From the typical experience of people, there are two quite distinct
circumstances where cause and free will collide.
a. Where the overall emotional state is ‘normal’, that is the overall level of energy is relatively low, then the difference between one route and another may be small, and the effort required to redirect the energy flow quite modest, so that then the mental set is determined by free will and ‘what I want’ as opposed to habit and cause. For example, a brainstorming session generates energy and re-directs energy into links that would not occur by way of cause alone. Here, non-preferred pathways are being adopted as a result of us expending energy into the task of finding new links for some ideas. Increasing the level of energy makes pathways that would not be preferred into potential options with the amount of energy available to the system being sufficient to overcome the energy barrier.
Part of the distinction between these
two psychological states may be due to activation of sensitised neurons, generally
increasing the level of energy in the system. However, this does not alone offer
explanation for the psychological fact that if we are rational and seeking new
ideas, then the gentle level of energy of brainstorming will often succeed,
whereas in some agitated state, the effort of containing emotional reactions
can be quite enormous, at times making us wonder if we can cope at all.
What emerges is the view that our emotions are a far greater driver of energy
that our cognitions, and where we are struggling to cope with cognitions, then
the core of our struggle is to understand and contain the emotions driving our
cognitions.
Understanding emotions
In the following questions and answers I have tried to address various issues
arising from the model.
| How do different emotions arise? |
The proposal is
that emotions are physically based; therefore they emotions must have
various chemical equivalents in the brain and CNS. This does not mean
that the exact same chemical has the exact same affect in every person,
although there is likely a range of emotions a chemical will generate,
and beyond this other chemicals are affective. Also, it is very possible
that the same chemical can induce variations of mood depending on the
amount released, and the cognitions accompanying the release. Finally,
it is also possible that combinations of chemicals result produce a
mood, and by altering the combinations, then many variations become
possible, again all associated with cognitions. These blends, and consistency
of these blends across mental sets account for the emotive part of attitudes,
even permeating the whole worldview, so a person is ‘fearful’, ‘optimistic’,
‘pessimistic’, ‘antagonistic’, etc. The person may not see himself or
herself this way, but others do; they may not register their state as
‘pessimistic’, yet all their worldview may be influenced by the chemical
blend that produces this feeling, for them it is ’normal’ state, and
likely they think everyone feels so. To express themselves as ‘pessimistic’
about something will involve additional levels of the chemical blend
and significantly heightened emotional experience from that they regard
‘normal’. |
| How do we know what is a proper emotion
under some given circumstances? |
Depending upon the circumstances,
there may be generic mood generation, for example flight or flee response,
on smiling and laughing, with someone nearly slipping in non-threatening
circumstances, or some degree of solemnity upon meeting new people.
Beyond such common and basic circumstances, then the emotions related
to circumstance is a cultural phenomenon and is not explicable under
this model, which can only state which is and suggest which is likely
not cultural. Note: that all details of emotions tied to cognition tied
to events describes values of variables of the model, and as such is
beyond the model itself, any suggested genetic implications only arise
as result of the universality of the reaction. |
| How do emotions ‘build up’ over time? |
With emotions chemically based
and our psychic energy contained in mental sets, then if a mental set
is repeated, and there is no resolution, no release of any issues, then
there it is within the scope of the model to propose such chemicals
can build up within the mental set, that is a physical build up, only
resolved by some form of release of the chemicals and that by some form
of completion of the mental set and that implied. It is then possible
at some point for the build up to be too strong, and for our containment
to fail, so the emotions ‘boil over’. |
| How and why do we feel righteous and feel
that some reaction is ‘me’? |
If for example, there is an urge to react in some manner, that urge will be causality at work, and we feel the urge resulting from the mental set systems seeking to proceed to their final resolution in outputs; and say our self-image is consistent with the outcomes and outputs of the urge. Then we will have feelings that this is me, it is how I feel and how I want to act. However, the outputs from the mental set may or may not be the most effective, for example, if it required beating a person near to death. |
| Why is it that in some rage ideas that
you know before and after are wrong can seem so right at that moment? |
Emotions are a greater driver
of mental sets that thought, so that when sensitised neurons triggered,
and serious emotions result, then the cognitions that best fit and suit
those emotions are likely to be triggered. It is essential to remember
that emotions cannot create cognitions, merely reinforce those that
currently exist. Rationally we may think this way; and ignore or otherwise
contain ideas that are extreme or unacceptable for moral or legal reasons.
When some emotions triggered, then the mental set associated may quite
overcome all else, and this will be especially true if self-image supports
the outputs of the mental set, and when or if we truly would like or
wish for the outputs from the mental set. See the discussion on collusion
of cause and psychic self. |
| What are deeper feelings? |
The model proposes there are
no ‘deeper’ feelings in the sense of truly below some other feelings.
They are all at the same level, but they are not all accessible to the
same degree, nor are they all as definite or as well supported by cognitions
that give sharpness to the emotions. So, some we may wish for something,
hardly daring to acknowledge it to ourselves, and never admitting it
to another. We may not even think about it too hard, and it may not
be completely clear what it is we wish for. It is not fully articulate,
not fully expressed even to ourselves, merely a vague desire that would
only crystallize if fate enabled it for us. Such might be a ‘deeper
feeling’. The idea of deeper feelings comes forth also in relationships,
but again, it is not ‘depth’, rather it is breadth, the extent feelings
are shared, and intensity, such that it is love, and not something more
superficial, such as companionship or affection. Each of these emotions,
love and affection, will involve different chemicals and chemical blends
within the person, these intertwined with actions and moods that reinforce
the idea of love, and this itself reinforced and supported by insight
and understanding of the other person that can only come with trust
and openness and time. |
| Is there a true self? |
There are at least three definite
facets of self: first, there is our self-image, that is images of how
we see ourselves, there is also thoughts about our selves, these being
some blend of positive and negative, supporting and self-defeating.
Second, there is what we might say about ourselves to another, and this
may bear no relation to the actual structures about our self. Finally,
there is how we conduct ourselves, and how others would see us. These
aspects of self may or may not be congruent. Each of these is ‘true’;
sayings such as ‘know thyself’, or ‘to self be true’, relate to working
to make the aspects of self congruent, and that being true to self is
avoiding too hasty decision, and ensuring that what is agreed is what
is felt in one’s heart, which itself means it has had time to be integrated
into all relevant mental sets, and it sits easily both in terms of what
I think, and it in terms of how I feel about it. |
| What is ‘instinct’ within this structure? |
First, the body knows and
has noted more than the mind sees, and as that comes forth then is instinct.
Bringing to the fore all of what we know, both mind and body, requires
we quiet the haste to fill the space. Cause will result in any quietness
in our minds; any space, being filled, and this activity will overpower
any emergent insights coming from what we, in the form of our bodies
and brains, might have seen or know, without our mind/consciousness
having registered we know. |
Summary of cause and free will